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Exclusivism and Exclusivity: 
A contemporary theological challenge 
 
 
Abstract 
The phenomenon of religious exclusivism increasingly confronts peoples of faith and 
goodwill who wish only for peaceful co-existence in equality and freedom with their 
religious neighbour. But there is more than one variety of religious exclusivism. This 
paper will show that there are at least three variants of religious exclusivism, namely 
open, closed and extreme. Further, inasmuch as exclusivism indicates a positing of 
religious identity over against any „other‟, then it will be argued that the variant 
exclusivisms themselves reflect a continuum of ideological and theological stance that 
is taken toward the concept of variety as represented by the religious „other‟ per se. This 
ranges through antithetical acknowledgement, enactive ignorance, and the intentional 
invalidation of variety. It is the issue of the invalidation of otherness which, I contend, 
constitutes the severe theological problem of religious exclusivism in extremis. It is 
here, in the modality of religious fundamentalism and extremism that theological 
ideology impinges most dramatically upon the public domain. Might it be possible to 
speak of a proper religious exclusivity without falling necessarily into the pit of 
exclusivist extremism? In addressing this question I shall briefly examine the views of 
Alvin Plantinga, Gavin D‟Costa, and the declaration Nostra Aetate of Vatican II. 
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Introduction 
Australian sociologist, Gary Bouma, speaks of our “twenty-first-century postmodern and 
secular world where spiritualities are rife and religious diversity is an accepted feature” as 
the contemporary temporal locus of “a seriously multicultural society”.1 Plurality rules, in 
virtually all things. But plurality can also be highly contentious, and that is certainly the case 
in some religious quarters. Indeed, in New Zealand, on the occasion of the May 2007 
meeting of the government-sponsored multi-national Asia-Pacific Interfaith Dialogue,
2
 the 
leader of the ultra-conservative Destiny Church, the self-titled “Bishop” Brian Tamaki, 
proclaimed his church‟s opposition to the promotion of religious diversity in New Zealand. 
Although resiling from advocating an outright exclusion of other religions, he nonetheless 
asserted that “alternative or foreign religions” should “not be afforded equal status” with 
Christianity. Tamaki represents an extreme conservative view that identifies “opening the 
door to a diversity of religions” with “dismantling our own Christian heritage”.3 In its 
dynamic essence, such sentiments parallel those of so-called Islamic fundamentalists who 
advocate an impositional Islamic State upon an otherwise majority, largely “traditionalist”, 
Muslim society. Significantly, whether Christian, Muslim, or whatever, such exclusivist 
viewpoint holders manifest no desire for interfaith détente, let alone any real interest in 
engaging in authentic dialogue. Indeed, far from it. 
 
In the context of discourse on interreligious dialogue exclusivism has been posited as the 
default position inimical to dialogue and against which, through the application of either 
inclusivism or pluralism, positions of openness to dialogical engagement have been 
                                                                                       
1 Gary Bouma, Australian Soul: Religion and Spirituality in the Twenty-first Century. Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006, 1. 
2 Waitangi, Bay of Islands, May 29-31, 2007. 
3 Cf. „Lockout sparks unholy row‟, The New Zealand Herald, A3, Tuesday, May 29, 2007, where  
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contrasted and advocated.
4
 A close analysis shows, however, that exclusivism, inclusivism 
and pluralism do not denote three discrete paradigms but that each refers, in fact, to a range 
of sub-paradigms that may be better thought of as expressing relative positions upon a 
continuum.
5
 Furthermore, it can be argued that, in the end, the pluralist must necessarily be 
an exclusivist of some sort, and that the paradigm of inclusivism, when pressed, also tends to 
collapse into some form of exclusivism.
6
 Nevertheless, the critical issue today, I contend, is 
not so much the vexed issue of pluralism, nor even problems raised by inclusivism, but 
questions posed by the persistence – even growth – of religious exclusivism.  
 
Recent analytical and reflective work into the phenomenon of contemporary religiously-
driven terrorism shows the presence of a distinctive and rigid form of exclusivity inherent to 
the paradigm of religious fundamentalism.
7
 Such exclusivity can certainly be understood as a 
variant of the paradigm of exclusivism, and exclusivism is itself an element of 
fundamentalist ideologies, whether religious or otherwise. A fundamentalist perspective, for 
example, is inherently absolutist: all other relevant phenomena are simply explained on its 
terms, or viewed in a relativising, even negating, way with reference to it. Fundamentalism, 
                                                                                       
4 See, for example, Alan Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 2nd Edition, London: SCM Press Ltd, 1993. 
5 Douglas Pratt, „Religious Plurality, Referential Realism and Paradigms of Pluralism‟ in Avery Plaw, ed., 
Frontiers of Diversity: Explorations in Contemporary Pluralism. Amsterdam & New York: Rodopi, 2005, 191-
209; – „Pluralism and Interreligious Engagement: The Contexts of Dialogue‟, in David Thomas with Clare Amos, 
eds., A Faithful Presence, essays for Kenneth Cragg, London: Melisende Press, 2003, 402-418. 
6 See, for example, the work of Gavin D‟Costa, especially „The Impossibility of a Pluralist View of Religions‟ 
(Religious Studies, 32, June 1996, 223-232). Cf. John Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion. 
Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001. 
7 See Douglas Pratt, „Religious Fundamentalism: A paradigm for terrorism?‟ in Rachel Barrowman, ed., 
International Terrorism: New Zealand Perspectives. Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University 
of Wellington, 2005, 31-52; - „Terrorism and Religious Fundamentalism: Prospects for a Predictive Paradigm‟. 
Marburg Journal of Religion (An on-line journal), Vol. 11/1, June, 2006, pp.11., see: http://web.uni-
marburg.de/religionswissenschaft/journal/mjr/  
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as a mindset, is a mentality that expresses the modern quest for universality and coherence 
writ large: only one truth; one authority; one authentic narrative that accounts for all; one 
right way to be. Fundamentalism typically excludes nuanced and variant readings of 
whatever is its authoritative text or guiding source. This is sometimes understood in terms of 
„literalism‟, but for a fundamentalist the key issue is that the source authority is such that no 
intermediary interpretive framework is required – the text itself provides pellucid expression 
of truth, whether in terms of an abstract universal, or in respect to a pragmatic or 
programmatic articulation of the values and views espoused by the fundamentalist as “The 
Truth”. Fundamentalism, on the one hand, may do little more than express an exclusive 
religious identity and worldview. On the other hand, it may also tend toward an extremism 
which, under certain circumstances, may itself lead to violence and terrorism. 
 
In today‟s world a rather sharp question can be posed: Is there a proper way of speaking of 
exclusive religion, or of religion in terms of exclusive identity, without necessarily falling 
into the pit of exclusivist extremism? It seems that, especially in the context of interreligious 
engagement and dialogue, if religious identity is not to succumb to syncretistic blurring or 
relativist reduction then some measure of exclusivity must necessarily apply. Religious 
identity, in being discrete, must – as with any discrete identity – incorporate a measure of the 
„exclusive‟ if only as a marker of, or a synonym for, being „unique‟; for uniqueness is a 
necessary element of identity per se. In which case, the paradigm of exclusivism, so long 
virtually automatically eschewed by all except, supposedly, fundamentalists, needs to be 
rehabilitated – or at least given a more nuanced attention so as to admit the distinction 
between exclusion (qua the behaviours of „excluding‟) and exclusive (qua the mark of 
distinctiveness). What interests me, in particular, is the fact that on the one hand a measure 
of exclusivity is logically required for clarity of identity, and that clarity of identity is a 
necessary prerequisite for dialogical engagement; yet, on the other hand, when taken to an 
extreme, exclusivity of identity militates against any sort of dialogical rapport by becoming 
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exclusionary – and that is a hallmark of extreme religious fundamentalism. So, the 
distinctive contemporary challenge is to clarify the exclusivity that adheres to proper 
religious identity as something distinct from the exclusion of religious exclusivism that is 
inimical of any validation of the „other‟.  
 
In order to address this challenge I shall begin by commenting on the context of religious 
plurality and the paradigms of exclusivism that connote one set of responses to this plurality, 
and also on religious exclusivism in the context of a nuanced understanding of 
fundamentalism. That will lead to a discussion of an understanding of exclusive religion that 
yet upholds the validation of religious variety. This will involve examining views of the 
philosopher Alvin Plantinga, the theologian Gavin D‟Costa, and the 1965 Vatican II 
declaration of the Catholic Church‟s relation to other religions (Nostra Aetate). The point of 
this discussion is to contrast the notion of religious exclusivity with the paradigms of 
religious exclusivism so as to resolve the problem of the invalidation of variety that appears 
to inhere to exclusivism per se.  
 
Religious plurality as context 
Plurality names much of the context of contemporary life; it names the present situation of 
religion in society. Religious plurality is a fact of our time in a way that, arguably, is 
qualitatively different to almost anything hitherto. Indeed, an affirmation of plurality is a 
hallmark of so-called post-modernity. As Bouma remarks, “Being consciously multifaith is 
part of being a postmodern society”.8 Individual freedoms today juxtapose with 
accommodating the presence of otherness: that which was formerly „other‟ in the sense of 
being not-present, of being „over-there‟, is now on our doorstep and down our street. Today, 
in just about all quarters of the globe, the religious dimension of any given community is 
pluriform. And this raises many issues, not the least of which is the manner of interrelating 
                                                                                       
8 Bouma, Australian Soul, 5. 
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across religious identities. The question of interreligious dialogue is thus not merely 
theoretical. People of different religious allegiances are neighbours who must talk with each 
other, live together in our communities, and together address concerns held in common. 
While most, if not all, religious traditions have unity – or internal uniformity and coherence 
– proclaimed as a sine qua non, the lived reality of many religious people today is the 
context of, and contention with, difference of viewpoint, experience, cognition, 
interpretation, and hence competing claims for allegiance and identity. Furthermore, this 
plurality is not only between religions, it is also something within religions. Both intra- and 
inter-faith dialogue, to be authentic, necessarily involves dialogical partners who are 
committed to, but not close-minded about, both their own religious identity and the cause of 
dialogue. And it is also the case that such dialogical engagement is rejected by some – 
indeed possibly many, if the global resurgence of religious fundamentalisms is anything to 
go by – as too threatening to the fundamentals of their faith, or too potentially disruptive of a 
secure religious identity.  
 
I would argue that the conditions for interreligious engagement and dialogue are set by the 
contextual paradigms that pertain to the understanding of the nature of religious diversity, or 
plurality, as such. These paradigms of perspective and interpretation in turn govern the 
nature and extent of interreligious engagement as lived reality. Broadly speaking, 
exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism may be regarded as the contextual paradigms for 
contending with this plurality, so setting the scene for interfaith relations and allied 
dialogical engagements.
9
 It is these paradigms, I suggest, which form the cognitive or 
intellectual background to interreligious engagement and dialogue and, indeed, provide the 
context within which things happen, or not – as the case may be. They denote various means 
of cognitively coping with religious diversity. Thus, religious plurality may be an 
inescapable reality, but it can be responded to cognitively in a number of ways, given its 
                                                                                       
9 Douglas Pratt, „Contextual Paradigms for Interfaith Relations‟. Current Dialogue, No 42, December 2003, 3-9. 
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acknowledgment as fact. And one mode of response – indeed, arguably, the default position 
of Christianity until comparatively recently, and the apparent default position of much of 
Islam – is that of exclusivism. But what, precisely, is this religious exclusivism? And in what 
way is it problematic? 
 
The response of religious exclusivism  
As a response to plurality as such, the paradigm of exclusivism may be formally defined as 
the material identity of particular and universal. That is to say, religious exclusivism 
involves the identification of a particular religion (or form of that religion) as being, in fact, 
the essence and substance of true universal religion as such, thereby excluding all other 
possibilities. From this viewpoint the exclusivist‟s religion is the „Only One Right One‟ 
because there can be only One that is right or true. That is to say, given the assertion that, 
from a religious viewpoint, truth and salvation are universal values, for example, the 
exclusivist position holds that this universality is materially identified with but one religion, 
namely that of the exclusivist. The Harvard theologian, Diana Eck, has commented that: 
 
The exclusivist affirms identity in a complex world of plurality by a return to the 
firm foundations of his or her own tradition and an emphasis on the distinctive 
identity provided by that tradition….Exclusivism is more than simply a conviction 
about the transformative power of the particular vision one has; it is a conviction 
about its finality and its absolute priority over competing views.
10
 
 
For the exclusivist the mutually tolerant co-existence of religions is simply not possible. 
John Hick, for example, speaks of religions in terms of “way of life” and “path of salvation”, 
in respect of which Christian exclusivism regards all but its own way and path as invalid or 
                                                                                       
10 Diana L. Eck, Encountering God, a Spiritual Journey from Bozeman to Banares, Boston: Beacon Press, 1993, 
174. 
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void. From the Catholic dogma of extra ecclesiam nulla salus to various conservative 
Protestant declarations of condemnation of any but their own viewpoint, the “controlling 
assumption”, says Hick “is that outside the church, or outside Christianity, there is no 
salvation”.11 Although formally discounted by both pluralists and inclusivists, exclusivism in 
fact remains a problematic impinging more on practical and pastoral dimensions of 
interreligious relations than on the realm of theoretical reflection. Yet theoretical reflection is 
impacted, and attending to it is a necessary task to which I now turn. 
 
I suggest the paradigm of exclusivism comes in at least three variants: open, closed, and 
extreme or „hard-line rejectionist‟. By its very nature exclusivism per se is hostile to any 
form of interreligious dialogue or rapport, yet it nevertheless impinges on interfaith 
engagement, most often contributing to outright resistance, or at least the undermining of 
efforts to engage in it. Exclusivism is varyingly undermining of interfaith engagement, and 
this is where nuanced variations of the application of the exclusivist paradigm may be more 
clearly identified. An open exclusivism, while maintaining cognitive and salvific superiority, 
may at least be amenably disposed toward the other, if only to allow for – even encourage – 
the capitulation (by way of conversion, for example) of the other. Some early twentieth 
century „open‟ exclusivists include Visser t‟Hooft, a leading ecumenical figure, who argued 
against what he viewed as “incipient pluralism” wherein syncretism and the notion of a 
single world-faith were viewed as inexorable outcomes of taking a non-exclusivist line. Yet 
he affirmed the value of cultural plurality nonetheless.
12
 Similarly, Hendrikus Kraemer, for 
many years a missionary in Islamic Indonesia, popularised and promoted the Barthian view 
                                                                                       
11 John Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths, rev. ed. London: Collins, 1977, 121. 
12 W.A. Visser t‟Hooft, No Other Name: The choice between syncretism and Christian Universalism, London: 
SCM Press, 1963, 88. 
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that, at the level of human institution, Christianity was no different to other religions in being 
yet another religion.
13
  
 
However, following Barth, Kraemer argued that with respect to its basis in revelation and the 
uniqueness of its truth-claims, Christianity is essentially other-than the religions. „Religion‟ 
thus names the human seeking for the divine; Christianity, by contrast, is the sole authentic 
arena of the divine encountering the human. Christianity stands apart, holding a position of 
exclusive privilege: “Christianity understands itself not as one of several religions, but as the 
adequate and definitive revelation of God in history”.14 Kraemer upheld the validity of 
cultural plurality, just like Visser t‟Hooft. Nevertheless, the open exclusivism espoused by 
such ecumenical Christian leaders of the 20
th
 century asserted a triumphant Christocentric 
salvific proclamation of essential Christian identity. Openness has limits, at least in so far as 
what openness might mean for the self-identity of that which is taking a stance of openness. 
Open exclusivism implies openness to some form of relationship with another without 
expectation of, or openness to, consequential or reciprocal change of self-identity with 
respect to that relationship. The “other” is acknowledged, but only as an “antithetical” other 
whose presence calls forth either or both of patronising and polemical engagement.
15
 
 
In contrast to open exclusivism, closed exclusivism simply dismisses the „other‟ out of hand. 
Relationship to the „other‟, especially the religious „other‟, is effectively ruled out. The 
„other‟ may be acknowledged as having its rightful place, but that place is inherently inferior 
to that of the closed exclusivist who, inter alia, prefers to remain wholly apart from the 
other. An „open‟ exclusivism may yet entertain a „dialogue‟ of sorts – perhaps a 
                                                                                       
13 See Kraemer, H., The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World. London: Edinburgh House Press, 1938. 
14 Ibid, 95. 
15 A cursory perusal of the respected journal International Review of Mission, established in 1912, will provide 
ample corroboration of these attitudinal stances. 
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conversational interaction – if only with a view to understanding the perspective of the other 
in order, then, better to refute it and so proclaim the „Only One Right‟ religion. By 
comparison, a „closed‟ exclusivism will spurn interaction with another religious viewpoint 
altogether: imperialist assertion is the only mode of communication admissible. The contrast 
between the „open‟ and „closed‟ forms of exclusivism is given instantiation by reference to 
two denominations of protestant Christianity, namely the Open Brethren and the Closed 
Brethren. The former function as an ultra-conservative Christian community; the latter live a 
sectarian existence, effectively withdrawn from the wider world. The Closed Brethren see 
themselves not just as superior to other forms of Christianity but, indeed, as the only true 
form which must be protected from contamination with lesser and corrupt forms of the faith.  
 
However, as indicated, I suggest that the open and closed variants are not the only forms of 
exclusivism that can be held. The third variant is that of extreme exclusivism which marks a 
shift from the closed form understood more simply as the exercise of a right to withdraw into 
itself, as it were. Extreme exclusivism gives expression to hard-line rejectionist exclusivity, 
the viewpoint that asserts an exclusive identity to the extent that the fact and presence of an 
„other‟ is actively resisted, even to the point of taking steps to eliminate the other. If 
examples of such extreme forms of exclusivism can be adduced from within the history of 
Christianity, then it is certainly the case that today the more obvious instantiations are to be 
found at the extremities of most major religions, with Islam currently to the fore. The 
distinguishing feature denoting extreme exclusivism is the negative valorising of the „other‟ 
– howsoever defined – with concomitant harsh sanctions and limitations imposed upon the 
other. It is this level of exclusive religion which, in its hostility to variety or „otherness‟ per 
se, inherently invalidates alterity. It is this level or version of religious exclusivism which 
lies at the heart of so much religious strife, not to mention terrorism and insurgency, and thus 
poses an acute challenge to those who would advocate religious freedoms, toleration, and 
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peaceful co-existence. It is this exclusivism that inheres to the extreme wings of religious 
fundamentalism. 
 
Religious exclusivism and fundamentalism 
The term „religious fundamentalism‟ denotes a worldview-type that can be found across 
different religions. In particular, it denotes a paradigm that paves the way for a shift in 
mentality from the relative harmlessness of an otherwise quaint, ultra-conservative – or in 
some other sense idiosyncratic relative to an orthodox „norm‟ – religious belief system, to 
the reality of a religiously motivated and fanatically followed engagement in aggressively 
impositional, even terrorist, activity. Paradoxically ideological exclusivism and polity 
inclusivism feature in a detailed consideration of fundamentalism. On the one hand 
ideological exclusivism means no competing or variant ideological view is granted 
credibility: a fundamentalist perspective will exclude, virtually automatically, anything that 
admits of limitation, provisionality, otherness, openness or change. On the other hand, 
religious fundamentalism inclines to the propensity to include, in respect to the policies and 
praxis of social organisation, all that falls within its frame of reference or worldview 
understanding. This may be innocuous, but it may equally be sinister. The main point is that 
the religious fundamentalist is now poised to become activist – to act exclusively, as it were, 
on its polity inclusivism whether covert (as in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints vicariously baptising the dead) or overt (as in the Taliban‟s insistence that everyone in 
Afghanistan live according to their application Islam). 
 
The exclusivism inherent in extreme fundamentalism involves the negation of otherness, or 
alterity as such, and the corresponding assertion of self-superiority over all opponents, real 
and putative. The negation of otherness is perhaps critical, for it involves a devaluing and 
dismissal of the „other‟, whether in terms of rival community or competing alterities, 
ideological or otherwise. In the process of negating the other, the self is asserted as 
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inherently superior. My God is greater than your god. My Truth reigns over your ignorance. 
And so on. Indeed, such alterities may be – and in fact often are – demonised. The 
religiously „other‟ on this view is often cast as „satanic‟, or at least seriously and 
significantly labelled as a hostile opponent, and so hostilely regarded. However expressed or 
referenced, it will be clear enough that the exclusivist fundamentalist is applying the key 
value set of negativity to otherness per se, and concomitantly asserting self-superiority.  
 
Arguably today we see much evidence of the imposition of fundamentalist‟s exclusive views 
and polity that are believed, by the fundamentalists concerned, to be sanctioned by a higher 
or greater authority – whether that authority is conceived in terms of deity or the dynamics of 
historical necessity. This reference transcends the local, particular, ordinary taken-for-
granted freedoms of everyday life with the requirement to be, live and do in accord with the 
fundamentalist‟s ideological dictates.16 The sanctioning of the imposition of the 
fundamentalist‟s programme may lead to the legitimising of extremist action, for once there 
is in place a sense of transcendent sanction for programmatic action the way to viewing as 
legitimate extreme behaviours to achieve requisite outcomes is eased. Sanctioned imposition 
and legitimated extremism are the two sides of the one coin in the currency of contemporary 
religious terrorism. Submission to the dictates of the fundamentalist is, thus, a matter of 
necessary imposition – as Afghani women found to their cost, for example. And the 
alternative to even an involuntary submission is outright destruction: hence, from the 
Taliban‟s fundamentalist perspective, the Buddha „idols‟ had to be destroyed. How else does 
the fundamentalist ensure that the imposition that has been sanctioned can actually be 
effected? In a nutshell, at the extremity of exclusive religion lies an inherent, and inevitably 
                                                                                       
16 For a discussion of the attempt by the Exclusive Brethren Church to impose its ideology onto the political arena 
in New Zealand, Australia and Canada, see Nicky Hager, The Hollow Men, Nelson: Craig Cotton Publishing, 
2006. 
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enacted, invalidation of otherness and variety as the necessary corollary of an unyielding 
religious exclusivism. 
 
Exclusive religion beyond religious exclusivism: the validation of alterity 
Alvin Plantinga, in articulating a defense of religious exclusivism,
17
 goes rather to the heart 
of the matter by asking: “What does the awareness of religious diversity mean or should 
mean for my religious beliefs?”18 Plantinga, for the sake of his discussion, defines 
exclusivism in terms of holding certain religious tenets to be true such that “…any 
propositions, including other religious beliefs, that are incompatible with those tenets are 
false”.19 He then goes on to counter purported attacks on exclusivism as being either morally 
deficient or epistemically faulty – what he refers to as criticisms of the “propriety and 
rightness of exclusivism”20 – and argues instead for the human inevitability of some form of 
exclusivism. It is not my intention here to rehearse his counter-arguments, for I think his 
definition of exclusivism, and so his targeted criticisms of it, to be far too narrowly focused. 
He takes his stand on the notion of discoverable absolutes – out of all possible religious 
answers to a given question, either one is true or none are true, but not more than one can be 
true if, prima facie, the answers are inherently incompatible. This amounts to an 
incommensurability reductio ad absurdum for exclusivism per se. The axiom further 
presumes a perspective that (i) can make a judgment that there is, or can be, an absolute 
answer as such, and (ii) that prima facie incompatible answers mean absolute irreconcilable 
incompatibility, and (iii) that a position of final determination of truth and falsity between 
given answers is at least potentially attainable. But can these be known to be so? Are they 
not themselves intentional judgements that guide interpretation and ratiocination? And is the 
                                                                                       
17 Alvin Plantinga, „A Defense of Religious Exclusivism‟, in Louis P. Pojman, ed., Philosophy of Religion: An 
Anthology. Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003, 507-521. 
18 Plantinga, „A Defense of Religious Exclusivism‟, 508. 
19 Plantinga, „A Defense of Religious Exclusivism‟, 509. 
20 Plantinga, „A Defense of Religious Exclusivism‟, 509. 
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assertion that there can be only one perspective that is right, only one winner with the rest 
consigned to necessary falsehood and/or delusion, the real point of exclusivism in relation to 
plurality? 
 
Although Plantinga strikes me as somewhat overstating the supposed moral and epistemic 
criticisms of exclusivism – or more aptly, of exclusivists – as manifesting arrogance, 
imperialism, and oppression on the one hand, and irrationality and lack of justification on the 
other, and also that he strays somewhat into the territory of „straw man‟ argumentation, the 
thrust of his concern is not so much with denying other religions, or alternative religious 
perspectives, but with maintaining appropriate distinction and differentiation. The reality of 
religious distinction cannot be reduced to a soup of sameness. In the end, his exclusivism 
equates somewhat with what I define as “open exclusivism” and for him the engagement 
with the realm of other religions and their beliefs serves only to reinforce the role of faith 
and promote cognitive humility. The religious exclusivist, on Plantinga‟s terms, may hold 
beliefs as true exclusively, but he also acknowledges that that gives no warrant for cognitive 
confidence. Religious belief is not the same as apodictic knowledge; faith is pre-eminent, 
although Plantinga is no simple fideist. In effect, he advocates for some sort of irreducible a 
priori exclusivity which, prima facie, adheres to all religions and which therefore allows for 
the possibility of mutual exclusion with respect to truth claims. But religion – as Plantinga 
himself concedes – is more than a question of belief; the exclusivity of markers of religious 
identity involves more than just a consideration of propositional Truth-claims. 
 
By way of a contrast to Plantinga, whom we may refer to as an intentional exclusivist, the 
theologian Gavin D‟Costa may be regarded as an intentional inclusivist who nonetheless 
shares similar concerns. In effect he approaches the question of habilitating exclusivism from 
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another tack.
21
 Although acknowledging the difficulty of “judging another religion by the 
criteria and standards of one‟s own”, he eschews the option of there being “neutral criteria” 
that stand outside of all religions, or are commonly found across them, as points of 
discriminating reference, and he argues in the end for the necessity of “a tradition-specific 
starting point”. Following Karl Rahner, D‟Costa advocates inclusivism defined as affirming 
“the salvific presence of God in non-Christian religions while still maintaining that Christ is 
the definitive and authoritative revelation of God”.22 D‟Costa is clear on the point of 
maintaining the fundamental core of Christian verity and interpretation of what is deemed 
true. On his terms, Christian identity is in no way to be compromised or challenged in 
respect to engagement with other religions, for there is a perspective of reality and truth 
which relativises all competing or conflicting claims. 
 
D‟Costa perhaps stands rather closer to an open exclusivism. His aim is to hold in dynamic 
tension two axioms of orthodox Christian belief: “that salvation comes through God in Christ 
alone, and that God‟s salvific will is truly universal”.23 On these points he promotes religious 
exclusivity even as he proposes that, indeed, engagement with other religions may well “lead 
to a self-discovery which can only enhance and clarify the most basic commitment of 
Christians, that in Jesus Christ, God has disclosed himself as a God of suffering and 
redemptive love”.24 D‟Costas‟s intentional inclusivism certainly has a ring of the exclusive 
about it. But the necessity he advocates of approaching religious issues and assessments 
from a religion-specific perspective is not so much an admission of religious exclusivism per 
se as recognizing the unavoidability of the exclusivity of religious identity – otherwise all 
would be in the melting pot of non-differentiated religious relativism.  
                                                                                       
21 Gavin D‟Costa, „Whose Objectivity? Which Neutrality?‟ in Gary E. Kessler, ed., Philosophy of Religion: 
Toward a Global Perspective. Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth, 1999, 562-573. 
22 Gavin D‟Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, 80. 
23 D‟Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, 136. 
24 D‟Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, 136. 
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Plantinga and D‟Costa represent two philosophical responses to the problem of exclusivity 
and exclusivism in the context of religious plurality. Plurality as such is not objected to; 
rather the question of its meaning and impact on religious identity and questions comparative 
assessments of truth and value is enjoined. In the process, the issue of distinguishing 
between ideological exclusivism, which rejects, denies, or in some sense negatively valorises 
any religious „other‟, and religious exclusivity that registers the distinctiveness and 
uniqueness inherent to religious identity as such, is highlighted. The question of attempting 
to resolve competing truth claims, for example, or the following of the logic of irreconcilable 
differences of worldview presuppositions and metaphysical beliefs regarded as axiomatic, do 
not necessarily imply the invalidation of the other as other. Indeed, to the extent Plantinga 
and D‟Costa represent contrasts of exclusivism and inclusivism with pluralism, they do so in 
the context of affirming the validity of alterity as such nonetheless. The other is accepted and 
acknowledged as „other‟; it just happens to be wrong or deficient – at least on the grounds 
that Plantinga and D‟Costa propose as representing unassailable positions on matters of 
religious truth.  
 
Vatican II: The Paradigm of Nostra Aetate 
The Nostra Aetate declaration of Vatican II,
25
 which rang in a sea-change in terms of the 
formal self-understanding of the Church‟s relations to non-Christian religions, may be 
regarded not so much a declaration of theological inclusivism – which it implies – as 
expressing a paradigm of exclusive religion that nonetheless expresses and upholds the 
validation of religious alterity. Wesley Ariarajah notes that Nostra Aetate “did not deal with 
the theological issues involved in relating to people of other faiths, but it advocated openness 
to other religions” yet, at the same time, it proclaimed “an uncompromising stand on the 
                                                                                       
25 See for example Francesco Gioia, ed., Interreligious Dialogue: The Official Teaching of the Catholic Church 
(1963-1995) Boston: Pauline Books and Media/Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, 1997, 37-40.   
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uniqueness of Christ”.26 An epoch-changing affirmation of the legitimacy of, and openness 
to, other religions was proclaimed in the context of an uncompromising assertion of an 
exclusive religious identity. As a critical passage from Nostra Aetate states: 
 
The Catholic Church rejects nothing of what is true and holy in these religions. She 
has a high regard for the manner of life and conduct, the precepts and doctrines 
which, although differing in many ways from her own teaching, nevertheless often 
reflect a ray of that truth which enlightens all men (sic). Yet she proclaims and is 
duty bound to proclaim without fail, Christ who is “the way, the truth, and the life” 
(John 14:6). In him, in whom God reconciled all things to himself (cf. 2 Co. 5:18-
19), men (sic) find the fullness of their religious life.
27
 
 
This declaration certainly “marks the beginning of a fresh approach of the Catholic Church 
to members of other faiths”; nevertheless the Council‟s thinking was not entirely new, rather 
“the sensitive approach suggested by some Catholic theologians was given official 
approval”.28 An attitude of openness to other faiths and their communities was clearly 
encouraged and, in another document of Vatican II, Lumen Gentium, the salvific relevance 
or dimension of other religions, especially that of Islam, was given due recognition, albeit 
within a framework of theological inclusivism.
29
 The overriding concern of Vatican II was 
arguably pastoral: innovation in both policy and practice was aimed at enhancing the life of 
the Church and its people. Accordingly, a special office, the Secretariat for Non-Christians, 
since renamed the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, was established to oversee 
                                                                                       
26 S. Wesley Ariarajah, Hindus and Christians: A Century of Protestant Ecumenical Thought Amsterdam: 
Editions Rodopi; and Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm B. Eerdmans, 1991, 29. 
27 Gioia, Interreligious Dialogue, 38. 
28 Marcus Braybrooke, Pilgrimage of Hope: One Hundred Years of Global Interfaith Dialogue. London: SCM 
Press, 1992, 247. 
29 Cf. Gioia, Interreligious Dialogue, 42. 
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relationships between Catholics and non-Christian religions.
30
 The Secretariat was charged 
with being “a visible and institutional sign of the dialogue with non-Christians” and its work, 
whilst providing inspiration, stimulation and guidance, was to “forestall all danger of 
irenicism and syncretism, and … dispel any false idea of the equal value of the different 
religions”.31 The early objectives of the Secretariat have been summarily stated as the 
opening of “friendly relations, communication and dialogue” with followers of other 
religions; the promotion within the Church of knowledge of other faiths with a view to 
stimulating this dialogue and communication.
32
  
 
Nostra Aetate signalled a radical disjunction from all previous predominating orientations: 
the past trajectory of negative inter-faith relations is to be “forgotten”.33 The patterns and 
perspectives that previously held sway were no longer held up as determinative for 
interreligious relations and the quest of dialogue.
34
 On the other hand a virtual default 
caveat, namely that a chief task in the pursuit of proper dialogue is “to avoid syncretism and 
                                                                                       
30 Paul VI, Apostolic Letter Progrediente Concilio, May 19, 1964. See Gioia, Interreligious Dialogue, 63-64, cf. 
p.121 for text of the Announcement of the Establishment of the Secretariat, Rome, May 17, 1964. See also 
Pastor Bonus, Apostolic Constitution of John Paul II, (June 28, 1988), Gioia, Interreligious Dialogue, 658-659, 
cf. Papal statement to the plenary session of the PCID, Rome, April 26, 1990, Gioia, Interreligious Dialogue, 
429-432. 
31 Paul VI, as cited in Gioia, Interreligious Dialogue, 159. 
32 Atuallah Siddiqui, Christian-Muslim Dialogue in the Twentieth Century London: Macmillan and NY: St 
Martin‟s Press, 1997, 44; see Rossano Pietro „The Secretariat for Non-Christian Religions from the Beginnings to 
the Present Day: History, Ideas, Problems‟, Bulletin secretariatus pro non christianis Vol XIV/2-3, nos. 41-2, 
(1979), 90. 
33 See J. Cuoq, „Toward Islamic-Christian Understanding‟, Bulletin secretariatus pro non christianis No 1 (1/1), 
1966, 23-27. 
34 Cf. Jacques Dupuis, S.J., Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to Dialogue, Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis and London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2002. 
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the distortion of Revelation”, was also noted.35 Thus, primarily in the text of Nostra Aetate 
itself, yet also in the corollary brief given to the Secretariat for Non-Christians, there is 
evidence of an emerging new paradigm – that of an exclusive religious identity that is yet 
relationally open. This contrasts with the preceding dominant paradigm in the life of the 
Church, namely that of an exclusivism that was effectively closed to meaningful and 
dialogical interactive relationship with any religious „other‟. It is the juxtaposition of 
relational openness and clear assertion of particular identity which precludes a slide into an 
identity-destroying relativism – where difference no longer matters or counts for anything – 
or a collapse into syncretism, wherein identities are blurred or merged. Ever since the 
promulgation of Nostra Aetate the Catholic Church has been vigilant in maintaining its 
distinctive Christian identity and witness to the preclusion of relativism and syncretism.  
 
The distinctive contemporary challenge, which Nostra Aetate arguably addresses, is the 
quest to clarify what is meant by an exclusivity of proper religious identity that yet avoids 
the relational limitations of a religious exclusivism hostile to interfaith relations. Clearly 
Nostra Aetate, and also subsequent dialogical developments advocated by the Catholic 
Church, eschews both closed and extreme paradigms of exclusivism. Nostra Aetate offers no 
comfort to religious fundamentalism. Prima facie it could appear to be advocating an open 
exclusivism, and a case could be made for this interpretation. However, even open 
exclusivism is so relationally limited that it would hardly provide a justifying basis for the 
pursuit of interfaith relations that has been attendant upon the promulgation of Nostra Aetate. 
I suggest, rather, that Nostra Aetate may be viewed as a paradigm of an „exclusive religion‟ 
– that is of religion that asserts its exclusive identity whilst nonetheless upholding the 
validation of religious variety – in contrast with the paradigms of exclusivism that imply, to 
lesser and greater degrees, the invalidation of any and all religious variety.  
 
                                                                                       
35 Braybrooke, Pilgrimage of Hope, 107. 
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Conclusion 
The critical contrast which has been addressed in this paper may be stated thus: exclusive 
religion as a matter of identity articulation on the one hand; religious exclusivism as a 
governing ideological set on the other. Exclusivity of identity is a requirement for 
interreligious relational engagement: interlocutors need to know who they are and that their 
respective identities are mutually exclusive, otherwise dialogue would effectively collapse. 
Exclusive religion is not a cipher for religious exclusivism; the one validates the variety of 
religious otherness, the other is intent on invalidating such otherness. Religious exclusivism 
plays into the hand of ideological extremism; exclusive religious identity allows for the 
integrity of difference and otherness and thereby the possibility of interfaith relations. Thus 
the paradigm of exclusive religion that yet upholds the validation of religious variety may be 
asserted as applicable to religious identity as such and in contrast to the paradigm of 
religious exclusivism as a specific marker of highly conservative or fundamentalist religion. 
The affirmation of a particular, unique, and so exclusive religious identity does not 
necessarily entail, nor require, a denial of alterity. Religious exclusivity is not the same as 
religious exclusivism: the one refers to identity uniqueness; the other to an excluding attitude 
and ideology. The former can be positively, or at least neutrally, disposed toward the fact of 
religious diversity and plurality, and indeed to engagement with the „other‟; the latter quite 
clearly is not. 
 
